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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning Saturday, February 21, 1976, Lawrence Fein, a Cali-
fornia attorney, felt brief pains in his chest. Fein sought medical
attention after he experienced these pains two more times in the next
four days. Medical employees of the Permanente Medical Group
(Permanente) examined Fein on Thursday, February 26, at 4 p.m.
and the next morning, at 1 a.m. Both times they diagnosed muscle
spasms as the cause of Fein's chest pains and treated him accordingly.
The chest pains persisted and became more severe. A third
Permanente employee examined Fein and ordered an electrocardio-
gram (EKG). The EKG showed that Fein had been suffering from a
heart attack (acute myocardial infarction).'
Lawrence Fein was unable to return to full time employment
until September 1977 due to his physical condition which resulted
from the two misdiagnoses. In February 1977, he brought a medical
malpractice action against Permanente.2 The Superior Court of Sac-
ramento County awarded Fein $787,733 in compensatory damages
and $500,000 for "noneconomic damages. ' ' 3 Permanente requested
1. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 141, 695 P.2d 665, 669, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 372 (1985).
2. Id.
3. Id. See infra note 84.
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that the court modify the award and enter a judgment pursuant to
California Civil Code section 3333.2 which places a $250,000 limit on
noneconomic damages. The trial court complied with Permanente's
request and reduced the noneconomic damages to $250,000.4 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed, holding that section
3333.2 did not violate either the due process or the equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.5 The Supreme Court of the
United States dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal
question.6 Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 106 S. Ct. 214, dis-
missing appeal from 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368
(1985), affirming 121 Cal. App. 3d 135, 175 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1981).
II. PRIOR LAW REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE RECOVERIES
The principal issue in Fein is whether California's statutory cap
on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions is constitu-
tional. Opponents of this statute assert that it violates the equal pro-
tection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. This
statute and others like it grew out of a phenomenon known as the
"medical malpractice crisis." The shortage of affordable medical mal-
practice insurance brought into serious question the adequacy of
health care in the United States. To deal with this growing problem,
every state in the union enacted legislation geared toward quelling the
"crisis." 7 Plaintiffs challenging this legislation have called upon state
courts to evaluate its constitutionality. These courts have responded
in every imaginable form.8
To provide an understanding of the logic behind the Supreme
Court's dismissal of the Fein appeal, this note will briefly survey the
events giving rise to the medical malpractice crisis.9 Second, this note
4. Id. at 143, 695 P.2d at 671, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 374. The court rejected the
constitutional attack in a pretrial ruling.
5. The fourteenth amendment states: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
6. When the Supreme Court of the United States dismisses an appeal, it is a decision on
the merits and is binding on all lower courts. See Note, The Precedential Effect of Summary
Affirmances and Dismissals for Want of a Substantial Federal Question by the Supreme Court
After Hicks v. Miranda and Mande v. Bradley, 64 VA. L. REV. 11 (1978). But cf id. at 134-35
(warning lower courts that resolving all doubts about the meaning of a summary disposition in
favor of deference to the Supreme Court would create an "unacceptable risk" that valid
constitutional claims would be summarily dismissed at the level of the lower court).
7. See, e.g., infra note 27.
8. See infra notes 28-126 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
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will examine the reasoning of state supreme courts that have evalu-
ated statutes that limit recoveries in medical malpractice cases.'0
Third, this note will analyze the equal protection and due process
issues raised by the varied constitutional challenges to statutes limit-
ing medical malpractice recoveries."' Finally, this note will evaluate
the potential impact of these challenges on the future of medical mal-
practice legislation and litigation."2
A. Evolution of the Medical Malpractice Crisis
By the nineteenth century the unintentional tort of negligence
had developed into a cause of action for medical malpractice.' 3 The
oldest recorded American medical malpractice litigation occurred in
1794 in the state of Connecticut. 14 Between 1794 and 1861 various
state supreme courts heard twenty-seven malpractice appeals.1 5
Through their decisions, courts raised the applicable standard of care
that physicians were required to use in the care of patients to a level
consistent with modern medical practice. 16 This upgraded standard of
care fueled an increase in malpractice claims. Many believe that the
alarming threat of malpractice caused some surgeons to abandon their
practices.17
Between 1935 and 1955, there were 605 reported malpractice
cases in the United States; an average of thirty-one cases per year. 8
The number of claims rose steadily during the next fifteen years, and
10. See infra notes 28-111 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 112-26 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
13. Flemma, Medical Malpractice: A Dilemma In The Search For Justice, 68 MARQ. L.
REV. 237, 240 (1985).
14. See Reed, Understanding Tort Law. The Historic Basis of Medical Leqal Liability, J.
LEGAL MED., Oct. 1977, at 53 (discussing Cross v. Guthrie, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794)). In
Cross, a husband sued a physician for the death of his wife who was undergoing a mastectomy.
The husband alleged that the physician performed unskillful, ignorant, and cruel treatment.
15. See Burns, Malpractice Suits in American Medicine Before the Civil War, BULL. HIST.
MED., Jan.-Feb. 1969, at 42. Two-thirds of these suits involved injuries relating to orthopedic
problems: fractures, amputations, and dislocations. Five involved obstetrics. This review is
interesting because the malpractice suits then and now reflect the predominant surgical
practices of the time.
16. Flemma, supra note 13, at 241. Courts originally held physicians to the standards
practiced among all those in the particular field, but as medicine became more scientific, the
courts held all practioners to certain minimal local standards. Over the years, the prevailing
standards changed from a duty of care based on local medical practices to a duty based on
national medical practices. Id.
17. See generally J. ELWELL, A MEDICO-LEGAL TREATISE ON MALPRACTICE AND
MEDICAL EVIDENCE, COMPRISING THE ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1860).
18. Stetler, The History of Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30 TEMP. L.Q.
336, 337 (1957). During this period, California lead the nation with almost seventeen percent
of all the cases, followed by New York, Washington, Ohio, and North Carolina. Id. at 368.
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by the 1970's, physicians began to perceive the increase in the number
and size of malpractice claims as a growing threat to their profession.
In response, members of the medical community instigated job
actions, strikes, and sit downs.' 9 Physicians, insurance companies
and state legislators referred to this phenomenon as a "medical mal-
practice crisis."' 20  Hospital malpractice insurance premiums rose
from $61 million in 1960 to $1.2 billion in 1976.21 Additionally,
insurance premiums for physicians skyrocketed.
By 1975, many questioned whether insurers would continue to
offer liability insurance for medical malpractice.2 2 In those states par-
ticularly affected by the rise in medical malpractice cases, insurers
asserted that providing malpractice insurance was both risky and
19. Flemma, supra note 13, at 242. In 1974, the Argonaut Insurance Company announced
a 380% increase in the cost of physician premiums. Other insurance carriers made similar
increases, and physicians threatened to strike. Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged Crisis
in Perspective, 3 W. ST. L. REV. 15, 27-29 (1975). The 1974 crisis was the culmination of
many years of a growing demand for medical services and an increase in medical malpractice
litigation. By 1966, 17.8% of all physicians reported that at least one of their former patients
had filed a malpractice suit against them sometime during their medical careers. In addition,
between 1966 and 1971, damage awards in medical malpractice cases increased 200%. Special
Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939,
940. While there was only one reported recovery in excess of $100,000 between 1935 and
1955, six figure recoveries are commonplace today. See Stetler, supra note 18, at 381; see also
Special Project, supra, at 940.
20. T. LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A LEGISLATOR'S VIEW (1978).
In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Malpractice Commission
strongly recommended using pretrial screening panels to speed up the resolution of medical
liability claims and eliminate nonmeritorious suits. See SECRETARY'S COMMISSION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE PUB. No. (05), REPORT ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, 73-78 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW Report].
It became evident that actuaries had been unable to project the proper premiums to cover
risks inherently associated with the practice of medicine. Id. at 5. The HEW Report
attributed the actuarial failure in part to the lack of statistical data regarding medical
malpractice claims. Id. at 13.
The insurance industry was not the only catalyst in this crisis. Numerous other factors
also contributed to its emergence: (1) a breakdown in doctor-patient relationships attributable
to specialization within the medical field; (2) the small number of physicians who maintain a
heavy workload, thereby increasing their chance for error; (3) lack of adequate peer review; (4)
the advent of consumerism; (5) the media's broadcast of the few large judgments against health
care providers; and (6) some inexperienced attorneys bringing frivolous claims. See Roth, The
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis, Its Causes, The Effects and Proposed Solutions, 44 INS.
COUNS. J. 469, 471 (1977).
21. The frequency of claims has tripled since 1976; the rate has grown 10% per year.
Address by Elvoy Raines, Management of Liability-Attaching Incidents, Seminar oil
Gynecologic Surgery, St. Thomas, V.I. (Feb. 16-19, 1984).
22. In 1975 the cost and availability of insurance was a serious problem in the following
nine states: Alaska, California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North
Carolina, and Ohio. See Witherspoon, Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting Liability
for Medical Malpractice, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419 (1980).
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unprofitable.23 The sudden increase in the number and size of claims
resulted in insurers raising premiums substantially.
During the two year period between 1975 and 1977, legislators in
fourty-nine states, succumbing to the intensive lobbying pressures
exerted by doctors and insurers, 4 passed laws to extinguish the "cri-
sis" situation. 25 These laws also had the effect of restricting and/or
modifying the rights of plaintiffs seeking redress for injuries arising
from medical negligence.26 One such provision limits the liability of a
negligent health care provider and denies seriously injured plaintiffs
recovery of damages that would otherwise be available under general
tort law principles. At the present time ten states have statutes that
limit liability for injuries resulting from medical malpractice.27 State
supreme courts that have addressed the issue have split opinions on
whether these statutes are constitutional.
B. State Supreme Court Reactions to Crisis Legislation Limiting
Medical Malpractice Recoveries
The Supreme Court of Illinois was the first court to analyze the
constitutionality of a statutory limitation 28 on liability in medical mal-
23. T. LOMBARDI, supra note 20, at 2.
24. The medical profession claims that the plaintiff's attorney contingency fee system
greatly contributed to the so-called "medical malpractice crisis" by encouraging the litigation
of frivolous suits. One study indicates, however, that the contingency fee system has the exact
opposite effect. "[T]he contingency fee system tends to discourage the acceptance of legally
meritorious malpractice cases involving minor injury and relatively small potential recovery."
HEW Report, supra note 20, at 33. The primary factors that caused the "crisis" and
apparently caught the legislature's eye were the increasing amount of malpractice claims and
the exceedingly high damage awards. See Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice
Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual
Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 144-45 (1981).
25. Witherspoon, supra note 22, at 419.
26. Learner, supra note 24, at 145.
27. Such provisions are found in the following codes: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (b) (West
Supp. 1983) (placing a $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages); IND. CODE § 40:1299 (B)(2)
(1978) (limiting total damages to $500,000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2821 (1982) (permitting
plaintiffs to elect out of a $500,000 cap on all damages), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (1978)
(limiting total damages, excluding punitive damages, medical care, and related benefits to
$500,000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1 14-11 (1983) (limiting total damages to $1 million); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2307-43 (Page 1981) (placing a $200,000 limit on general damages); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (1979) (limiting general damages to $500,000 and placing no
monetary limit on special damages); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1982)
(placing a $500,000 limit on damages other than medical or custodial care); VA. CODE § 8.01-
581.15 (Supp. 1983) (limiting total damages to $1 million); cf FLA. STAT. § 768.54 (2) (b)
(West. Supp. 1982) (limiting the liability of health care providers, other than hospitals, to a
maximum of $2 million per claim plus punitive damages, and establishing a state-run fund to
award damages to the extent the verdict of judgment exceeds the liability limitation).
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1013a (1975).
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practice actions. In Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass1n, 29 the
court observed that actions in medical malpractice, unlike violations
of the wrongful death statute,30 the Dram Shop Act,3 or the Work-
man's Compensation Act, 32 existed at common law. 33 The court rea-
soned that a legislature which statutorily creates a cause of action
may also limit its recovery. This did not, however, preclude the legis-
lature from substituting a statutory remedy for the common law rem-
edy.34 Nonetheless, the court determined that a law that permitted or
denied recovery on an arbitrary basis would violate the Illinois Con-
stitution. The court found that the statutory provision limiting recov-
ery only in medical malpractice actions to $500,000 was arbitrary and
constituted a special law in violation of the 1970 constitution.35 In so
holding, the Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the defendant's argu-
29. 63 I11. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
30. The Supreme Court of Illinois pointed out:
[Tlhere was no common law cause of action for wrongful death, and the General
Assembly had created the action by statute in 1853. In our opinion the
constitutional question is not formidable when it is considered in the context of
the situation that existed when the statute was originally enacted. At that time
no action whatsoever was permitted for a wrongful death. The legislature took
away no right when it enacted the statute. It created both the right and the
remedy, and we think that its power to limit the maximum recovery in the action
that it created cannot be questioned.
Id. at 318, 347 N.E.2d at 741-42 (quoting Hall v. Gillins, 13 111. 2d 26, 31, 147 N.E.2d 352, 357
(1958)).
31. In Cunningham v. Brown, the court held that no common law action existed for
damages against a supplier of alcoholic liquor for injuries inflicted by an intoxicated person, or
resulting from intoxication. 22 I11. 2d 23, 30, 174 N.E.2d 153, 160 (1961). The Dram Shop Act
of 1872 created such a cause of action, therefore the Illinois statute was valid even though it
provided a limitation on the amount of recovery. Wright, 63 I11. 2d at 320, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
32. The court stated:
The Workmen's Compensation Act provided a quid pro quo in that the employer
assumed a new liability without fault but was relieved of the prospect of large
damage judgments, while the employee, whose monetary recovery was limited,
was awarded compensation without regard to the employer's negligence .... By
the Workmen's Compensation Act, the legislature required the employer to give
up certain defenses and required the employee to give up certain recoverable
elements of damage of a common-law negligence action; and this we have held
many times is a reasonable exercise of the legislature's police power for the
promotion of the general welfare.
Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 II1. 2d at 320, 347 N.E.2d at 742 (quoting
Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 I11. 407, 412, 137 N.E.2d 842, 845 (1956)).
33. Wright, 63 111. 2d at 320, 347 N.E.2d at 742 (citing Ritchey v. West, 23 111. 329 (1860)).
34. "Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
which he may receive in his person, property or reputation; .... Hall v. Gillins, 13 I11. 2d
26, 147 N.E.2d 352, 353 (1958) (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1, 2 (1957)).
35. Wright, 63 111. 2d at 319, 347 N.E.2d at 742-43 (citing the Illinois statute which states:
"The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made
applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable is a matter for judicial
determination." ILL. REV. STAT. ART. IV § 13 (1975)).
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ment that society would benefit from the limiting of medical malprac-
tice recoveries by lowering malpractice insurance premiums and
medical care costs. The court believed that those benefits would not
extend to the seriously injured medical malpractice victim.3 6
Justice Underwood found no constitutional infirmity in imposing
a limitation on damage awards. In his dissent, he noted that while the
limitation bears heavily on the severely injured plaintiff, the desirabil-
ity of "having adequate health care available at reasonable costs"3 7
outweighs the burden on medical malpractice plaintiffs. Ironically,
the fact that awards rarely exceeded the limitation, thus, affording
protection to the vast majority of malpractice victims, persuaded the
dissent to find the limitation constitutional.38
Idaho has a limitation of liability statute,3 9 although the Supreme
Court of Idaho has not yet definitively addressed its constitutionality.
In Jones v. State Board of Medicine,4° the Supreme Court of Idaho
wholly rejected the same argument that the Supreme Court of Illinois
considered in Wright.4 1 Specifically, the Jones court rejected the argu-
ment that the statute limiting medical malpractice recoveries abro-
gated a formerly existing common law right while failing to provide a
substitute remedy.42
The Supreme Court of Idaho entertained contentions that the
limitation violated the due process 43 and equal protection 4 clauses of
36. Id. at 319, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
37. Id. at 323, 347 N.E.2d at 746 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 324, 347 N.E.2d at 747 (Underwood, J., dissenting).
39. The Idaho legislature enacted a statute as a result of the alleged "medical malpractice
insurance crisis." Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 862, 555 P.2d 399, 402 (1976).
This statute places limitations on the remedies and recovery of medical malpractice actions in
Idaho against physicians and health care facilities licensed in the state. The legislature set the
ceiling for recoverable damages in actions against physicians at $150,000 per claim and
$300,000 per occurrence. See IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (1977). The statute also sets a ceiling on
recoverable damages for actions against acute care hospitals at $150,000 per claim and
$300,000 per occurrence or the amount of $10,000 multiplied by the total number of beds in
the hospital. See id. § 39-4205. The statute limits the grounds for malpractice actions to those
of common law negligence and requires that recovery be restricted to compensatory damages
that collateral sources do not satisfy. See id. § 39-4210. The statute also requires all
physicians and hospitals in Idaho to obtain malpractice insurance as a condition of licensure.
Id. §§ 39-4206, -4208, -4209.
40. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
41. 63 111. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
42. Jones, 97 Idaho at 863, 555 P.2d at 403. The Supreme Court of Idaho held that "[t]o
adopt that argument would be to hold that the common law as of 1890 governs the health,
welfare, and safety of the citizens of this state and is unalterable without constitutional
amendment." Id. at 864, 347 N.E.2d at 404.
43. Id. at 868, 555 P.2d at 407-08. The respondents in Jones contended that the 1975
Hospital-Medical Liability Act constituted a denial of due process in three respects: "(1) It
deprives respondents of their constitutional right to pursue a recognized profession; (2) it
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the federal and Idaho constitutions. The court, however, remanded
the case back to the trial court for further fact findings in order to
determine the validity of the stated purpose45 of the statute and the
relationship between the statutory limitation and its intended pur-
pose.46 Furthermore, the court clearly stated that it would utilize an
intermediate level of scrutiny when it addressed the due process and
equal protection arguments presented in the case.47
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in Prendergast v. Nelson48
vaguely concerned itself with the constitutionality of a statutory limi-
tation on liability in medical malpractice actions.49 In a plurality
limits medical malpractice actions without a corresponding quid pro quo; and (3) the recovery
provisions are arbitrary, without a rational basis and against public policy." Id. at 867, 555
P.2d at 408.
The Supreme Court of Idaho decided that the respondents wanted the court to recognize
that the pursuit of an occupation is a liberty and property interest which the due process
clauses of the state and federal constitutions protect. The federal due process clause also
protects against legislative interference with an individual's fundamental rights, unless such
interference is necessary to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the citizenry. "This
recognition does not impede the power of the legislature to regulate callings that are related to
the public health so long as such regulations are not arbitrary or unreasonable." Id. The Jones
court held that the requirements of the 1975 Hospital-Medical Liability Act do not violate the
guarantees of due process because they bear a rational relationship to the health and welfare of
the citizens of the state by providing protection to patients who may be injured as a result of
medical malpractice. Id.
44. Id. at 870, 555 P.2d at 410. The respondents in Jones also argued that the portions of
the 1975 Hospital-Medical Liability Act that limit recovery in medical malpractice actions
create a discriminatory classification that violates the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment and the Idaho Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. I,
§ 2. The classification that the statutes create distinguishes between those who incur damages
of more than $150,000 as a result of medical malpractice and other malpractice victims who
incur damages of less than $150,000. Thus, those who are damaged in excess of the statutory
limitation are denied full recovery. Jones, 97 Idaho at 870, 555 P.2d at 410. The court
recognized that the standard of review that it uses determines whether it finds the classification
invidiously discriminatory, and therefore in violation of the guarantees of equal protection. In
Jones, the court determined that the challenged classification was neither suspect nor did it
involve fundamental rights. Id.
45. Id. The act declared that its purpose was "to assure that a liability insurance market
be available to ... physicians, and licensed hospitals ... and that the same be available at a
reasonable cost, thus assuring the availability of such hospitals and physicians for the provision
of care to persons of the state." Id. at 810, 555 P.2d 409-10 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 39-4202
(1977)).
46. Id. at 870, 555 P.2d at 410.
47. Id. at 871, 555 P.2d at 411. The Supreme Court of Idaho wrote, "While we recognize
and agree with the concept of judicial restraint as it cautions against substituting judicial
opinion of expediency for the will of the legislature, nevertheless, blind adherence and over-
indulgence results in abdication of judicial responsibility. Id. This court admitted, however,
that it ordinarily applies the test of minimum scrutiny to questions that arise in challenges to
legislation. Id. at 870, 555 P.2d at 410.
48. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
49. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2821 (1982) provides:
Unless the patient or his representative shall have (a) elected not to be bound by
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opinion, the court rebuffed plaintiff's argument that a ceiling on judg-
ments constitutes a special privilege for the health care provider and
an undue restriction on the seriously injured patient. The court rea-
soned that the Nebraska procedure is an elective one which guaran-
tees the claimant an assured fund of $500,000 for the payment of any
malpractice claim. The claimant may opt out of the statute and face
the possibility of no recovery against a practitioner who has been
unable to acquire any malpractice insurance.50 The court found the
limitation constitutional because the classification created bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. 5'
In Arneson v. Olson,5 2 the Supreme Court of North Dakota found
that a $300,000 limitation of liability provision" in medical malprac-
tice cases violated the equal protection clauses of both the state and
federal constitutions. The legislature stated that it passed the statute
"to assure the availability of competent medical and hospital services
to the public in North Dakota at reasonable costs." 54  The legisla-
ture's stated purpose did not influence the North Dakota court.55 The
the terms of §§ 44-2801 to 44-2855, (b) filed such election with the director in
advance of any treatment, act or omission upon which any claim or cause of
action is based, and (c) notified the health care provider of the election as soon as
is reasonable under the circumstances that such patient has so elected, it shall be
conclusively presumed that the patient has elected to be bound by the terms of
§§ 44-2801 to 44-2855.
50. Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 109, 256 N.W.2d at 669.
51. Id. Additionally, the statute assures the claimant access to an impartial medical
review panel that will determine whether the health care provider met the applicable standard
of care. By electing to go to the medical review panel, the claimant agrees to the $500,000
ceiling. Id.
To support its decision, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated: "Our Legislature is
presumed to have acted within its constitutional power despite the fact that in practice its laws
may result in some inequality. We will not set aside a statutory discrimination if any state of
facts reasonably exists to justify it." Id. The Prendergast court defined its role with respect to
a crisis motivated legislature. The court stated: "To attempt to meet a crisis, the Legislature is
free to experiment and to innovate and to do so at will, or even at the whim." Id. The court
stated that the statute was necessary because of an imminent danger that medical services in
Nebraska would be curtailed. Id. at 108, 256 N.W.2d at 668. Thus, the limitation was a
legitimate legislative response to a potential health care problem. Kehoe, Medical Malpractice.
A Sojourn Through the Jurisprudence Addressing Limitation of Liability, 30 Loy. L. REV. 19,
131 n.103 (1984).
52. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-14-11 (1983).
54. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 127.
55. The court noted that Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Group was distinguishable
from this situation. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). In Duke, the Supreme Court held that a limitation on
recovery for damages from a nuclear accident was justified because of the "extremely remote
possibility of an accident where liability would exceed the limitation" of $560 million. This,
plus a commitment by Congress to "take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate
to protect the public from the consequences of" any such disaster, was "within permissible
limits and not violative of due process. Id. at 2637. In Arneson, there was a strong possibility
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Arneson court adopted the Wright reasoning that a legislature may
not arbitrarily eliminate or limit a preexisting common law right.56 In
departing from the rational basis test, the court employed an interme-
diate level of scrutiny that requires a "close correspondence between
statutory classifications and legislative goals."5 7
The Supreme Court of North Dakota found a tenuous relation-
ship between the recovery limitation and the statutory goal. The
court stated the following reasons for this disparity: (1) the limitation
failed to adequately compensate seriously injured victims with merito-
rious claims and had absolutely no impact on the filing of nonmerito-
rious claims;58 (2) the limitation encouraged physicians to enter or
remain in medical practice in North Dakota at the expense of the
seriously injured victim of malpractice;59 (3) the limitation might not
allow the victim to recover all medical expenses that he might other-
wise incur; (4) the "incidence of malpractice claims in North Dakota
was far lower than the average in the U.S ..... [T]hus premiums were
unjustifiably high for states such as North Dakota with fewer claims
and smaller settlements and judgments";6" and finally, (5) neither an
insurance availability crisis nor an insurance costs crisis existed in
North Dakota.6' In short, through its use of an intermediate level of
scrutiny, the court was able to discover whether the factual underpin-
nings of the medical malpractice crisis, which the legislature claimed
would promote the enactment of a limitation restricting plaintiff's
right to recovery, really existed or were merely figments of legislative
imagination.62
In Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.,63 the Supreme Court of
Indiana became the first state supreme court majority decision that
found a limitation of liability provision constitutional.64 The court
based much of its analysis on the similarities between Indiana's legis-
of damages above the limitation and no legislative commitment beyond the limitation.
Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135 n.6 (citing and discussing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978)).
56. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136.
57. Id. at 133.
58. Id. at 135-36.
59. Id. at 136.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 135-36.
62. Kehoe, supra note 51, at 131-32.
63. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
64. This statute limits the total recovery in medical malpractice cases to $500,000 and
limits the liability of any health care provider to $100,000 per occurrence. Any amounts due
from a judgment or settlement which is in excess of the total liability of all health care
providers are paid from the patient's compensation fund pursuant to provisions of the Indiana
Medical Act. See IND. CODE § 40:1299 (1978).
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lative responses to the medical malpractice crisis and the United
States Congress' legislative response in the nuclear power field.65 In
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Group, Inc., plaintiffs
unsuccessfully challenged the Price Anderson Act.66 In this case the
court used the rational basis test,67 and found that the limitation was
not arbitrary and irrational, but rather, a rational means of achieving
the two stated purposes of the legislation, namely: (1) "preserving the
availability of health care services"; and (2) maintaining an environ-
ment where malpractice insurance is available68 and used.69
Although the limitation admittedly denied seriously injured
plaintiffs full recovery, the Indiana court noted that it also provided
those plaintiffs and the rest of the community with reciprocal benefits.
For example, if the insurance industry had continued to operate in a
state of uncertainty without the limitation serving as a factor in calcu-
lating premiums, it is possible that malpractice insurance would have
become too expensive or totally unavailable.70 Under such circum-
stances, seriously injured plaintiffs would have little or no chance of
recovering substantial sums of money for injuries suffered. It follows
that the limitation may have the effect of stabilizing insurance rates,
thereby reducing the shortage of insurers willing to provide coverage
to medical practitioners. This, in turn, will alleviate the reluctance of
65. Johnson, 273 Ind. at 388, 404 N.E.2d at 599. In both the Price-Anderson Act and the
Indiana Malpractice Act, the legislatures established a form of government sponsored
insurance, set limitations on liability, and placed the burden of the limitation upon persons
injured by the industry. Id.
66. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 141-42 & 147 and accompanying text.
68. Johnson, 273 Ind. at 390, 404 N.E.2d at 601. The record before the court established
that the increasing number and size of claims were prompting some insurers to curtail
insurance coverage to some health care providers. The legislature, in turn, responded to this
situation by creating a "government sponsored risk spreading mechanism as an alternative to
insurance strictly from private sources." Id.
69. Id. at 388, 404 N.E.2d at 599. The court held that the recovery limitation was
constitutional, and then went on to note that the limitation could present a burden to severely
injured plaintiffs:
It provides a factor for calculating premiums and charges to those covered. An
insurance operation cannot be sound if the funds collected are insufficient to meet
the obligations incurred. It must, however, be accepted that the badly injured
plaintiff who may require constant care will not recover full damages, yet at the
same time we are impressed with the large amount which is recoverable and its
probable ability to fully compensate a large proportion of injured patients. In the
same vein, badly injured patients would have little or no chance of recovering
large sums of money if the evil the act was intended to prevent were to come
about, i.e., that an environment would develop in the State in which private or
public malpractice insurance were unavailable or unused.
Id.
70. Id.
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those same practitioners who were unable to acquire coverage in the
past to now provide their services to the public.71
The Indiana court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the limi-
tation violated the equal protection clause of both the Indiana and
federal constitutions.72 The court determined that the classification
created by the statute was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable."7 3
Additionally, the Indiana statute provided for government sponsored
medical malpractice insurance which would provide medical malprac-
tice insurance at a reasonable cost, thus extinguishing the growing
risk of worthless judgments.7 4
In Carson v. Maurer," the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in
a per curiam opinion, invalidated a statutory provision that limited a
plaintiff's right to recover noneconomic damages of $250,000.76 The
legislature stated that the purpose of the statute was to "stabilize
insurance risks and reduce malpractice insurance rates."' 77 The court
determined that this provision denied plaintiffs equal protection of the
law because it created an arbitrary damage limitation that precluded
only the most seriously injured victims of medical malpractice negli-
gence from receiving full compensation for their injuries.78
The court used an intermediate level of scrutiny, and found a
weak relationship between the limitation on recovery and the legisla-
tive goal of reducing insurance rates. 79 Two reasons support this
view. First, "paid out damages awards constitute only a small part of
total insurance premium costs," and second, "few individuals suffer
noneconomic damages in excess of $250,000. "1 80 The inequities
imposed upon the seriously injured malpractice victims persuaded the
court to concur with the Arneson court."1 The Carson court stated
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 389, 404 N.E.2d at 600.
74. Id.
75. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
76. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1979).
77. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. at 936, 424 A.2d at 836. The statute attempts to achieve
this goal by providing that insurers will not have to pay damages for "pain and suffering or
other non-economic loss" in excess of $250,000. Id.
78. Id. The court acknowledged that though the right to recover for personal injuries is
not a "fundamental right" which would require the court to use a strict scrutiny standard, it is
an important substantive right, "sufficiently important to require that the restrictions imposed
on those rights be subjected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the
rational basis test." Id. at 930, 424 A.2d at 830.
79. Id. at 936, 424 A.2d at 836.
80. Id. at 936, 424 A.2d at 836-37.
81. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, agreeing with the Supreme Court of North
Dakota's reasoning stated:
[Tlhe limitation of recovery does not provide adequate compensation to patients
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that "[i]t is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of
supporting the medical care industry solely upon those persons who
are most severely injured and therefore most in need of
compensation." 82
C. The Supreme Court of California's Reasoning in Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group
In Fein, 3 the Supreme Court of California, deferring to the Cali-
fornia state legislature, found that the $250,000 statutory limitation
on noneconomic damages84 is rationally related to the legitimate legis-
lative objective of lowering the costs of insuring health care provid-
ers. 5  Moreover, the court found that the limitation was neither
arbitrary nor irrational because there was ample evidence to support
the legislature's perception that a "medical malpractice crisis"
existed.8 6 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of California held that the
with meritorious claims, on the contrary, it does just the opposite for the most
seriously injured claimants. It does nothing toward the elimination of
nonmeritorious claims. Restrictions on recovery may encourage physicians to
enter into practice and remain in practice, but do so only at the expense of
claimants with meritorious claims.
Id. at 937, 424 A.2d at 837.
82. Id. The court refused to apply a formula or mathematical tool to compute
noneconomic damages. Instead, the court recommended the use of a remittitur to control
excessive jury awards. Id. See, e.g., Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 119 N.H. 457, 466, 404 A.2d
1094, 1099-1100 (1979) (reducing an award of $150,000 to $125,000 for the loss of a portion of
three fingers).
83. 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
84. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1975). This statute provides:
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional
negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to
compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment,
disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage. (b) In no action shall the amount
of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars
($250,000).
Id.
85. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 156, 695 P.2d at 686, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
In May 1975, the Governor-citing serious problems that had arisen throughout
the state as a result of a rapid increase in medical malpractice insurance
premiums-convened the Legislature in extraordinary session to consider
measures aimed at remedying the situation. The Governor's proclamation stated
in part: "The cost of medical malpractice insurance has risen to levels which
many physicians and surgeons find intolerable. The inability of doctors to obtain
such insurance at reasonable rates is endangering the health of the people of this
State, and threatens the closing of many hospitals. The longer term
consequences of such closings could seriously limit the health care provided to
hundreds of thousands of our citizens."
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 361, 683 P.2d 670, 672, 204
Cal. Rptr. 671, 673 (1984) (citing Governor's Proclamation to the Legislature (May 16, 1975)).
86. Id. at 153, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Evidence of the medical malpractice
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limitation is constitutional.
The court rejected claims that California Civil Code section
3333.2 denied due process to malpractice claimants. The plaintiff
argued that the statute limits his potential recovery without providing
him with an adequate alternative. 87 Like other courts plagued by this
assertion, the Supreme Court of California noted that a plaintiff has
no vested property right in a particular measure of damages .8  More-
over, the legislature possesses broad authority to modify the scope
and nature of such damages.8 9
In deferring to the legislature, the court emphasized that the con-
stitutionality of measures affecting such economic rights under the
federal due process clause does not depend on a judicial assessment of
the justifications for the legislation, or on its wisdom or fairness. So
long as the measure is rationally related to a legitimate state interest,
policy determinations as to the need and desirability of the enactment
are best left for the legislature.9"
The court acknowledged that the California statute, in seeking to
lower malpractice costs, would give rise to lower judgments for plain-
tiffs than previously obtainable. Even though the legislature placed a
$250,000 cap on awards of noneconomic damages, no limit was
placed on a plaintiff's right to recover economic or pecuniary
damages.9'
crisis included: (1) increasing numbers of claims, judgments, settlements, and rising insurance
costs; (2) reduction of the number of health care insurers; and (3) financial losses by several
insurers. Id.
87. Id. at 149, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
88. Courts in Illinois, Idaho, Ohio, and Indiana considered the issue as it relates to
limiting medical malpractice recoveries. For a discussion of the quid pro quo issues relating to
the limitations placed on medical malpractice recoveries, see supra notes 33-34, 41-42, 50 & 56
and accompanying text.
89. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 151, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
90. Id. The court cited American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., which held
that the legislature retains broad control over the measure, as well as the timing, of damage
awards. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 375, 683 P.2d 670, 685, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 686, cited in Fein, 38 Cal.
3d at 151, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382. Additionally, the legislature may expand or
limit recoverable damages so long as its action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Id. at 152, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
91. Id. The opinions of legal scholars influenced the opinion in Fein. These legal scholars
have raised serious questions concerning the wisdom of awarding damages for pain and
suffering in any negligence case. Id. For a forceful criticism of the rationale for awarding
damages for pain and suffering in negligence cases, see Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury.- The
Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 240 (1953) (suggesting that we retain
negligence actions, but eliminate certain extras which would result in very modest payments to
those injured); Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 476, 483 (1959)
(suggesting that legislatures acting prospectively limit pain and suffering recoveries gradually
by postponing the effective date of the statute so that insurance companies can suitably adjust
their rates); Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 200, 210 (1958)
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The court observed that the legislature had to contend with the
prospect that, in the absence of some cost reduction, medical malprac-
tice plaintiffs might have difficulty collecting judgments for any of
their damages, pecuniary as well as nonpecuniary. Therefore, the leg-
islature reached a rational conclusion that it was in the public interest
to attempt to obtain some cost savings by limiting noneconomic
damages.
The Fein court distinguished cases from other state courts that
declared similar provisions unconstitutional. 92 With one exception,
all of the invalidated statutes concerned a ceiling which applied to
both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. 93 Several of the other
courts, in reaching their decisions, were apparently influenced by the
potential harshness of a limit that might prevent an injured person
from ever recovering the amount of his medical expenses.94
The Supreme Court of California also rejected claims that section
3333.2 of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA)95
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Plaintiff claimed that MICRA impermissibly discriminates between
medical malpractice victims and other tort victims.96 Also, it improp-
erly discriminates within the class of medical malpractice victims,
denying a "complete" recovery to those malpractice plaintiffs with
noneconomic damages exceeding $250,000. 9'
The court quickly dismissed the first contention by acknowledg-
ing the existence of a medical malpractice insurance "crisis", noting
(recommending that legislatures establish a "fair maximum" limit on the award of pain and
suffering); Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 42 (1954)
(suggesting a study of damages for pain and suffering which would group injuries based on
severity and longevity and provide maximum and minimum awards rather than definite figures
for these injuries).
92. The Supreme Court of California considered the opinions of the following courts
which invalidated statutory provisions that put a limit on recoveries in medical malpractice
actions: Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976);
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
(N.D. 1978). But see Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980)
(upholding the statutory limit on damage awards in medical malpractice cases); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) (same).
93. The one exception is Carson v. Maurer, in which the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire struck down a statutory provision that placed a limit only on noneconomic
damages similar to the one in California. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). The Carson
court, in invalidating a variety of provisions in this medical malpractice legislation, applied an
"intermediate scrutiny" standard of review that is inconsistent with the standard applicable in
California. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d at 167, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 395.
94. See supra notes 36, 42, 61 & 79 and accompanying text.
95. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 167, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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that the legislative enactment of MICRA is rationally related to the
legislative purpose of quelling that crisis.9" With respect to the second
contention, the court first emphasized that the equal protection clause
does not require the legislature to limit a victim's out-of-pocket medi-
cal expenses or lost earnings simply because it found it appropriate to
place some limit on damages for pain and suffering and similar
noneconomic losses.99 Second, the court hypothesized that the legis-
lature could have eliminated discrimination between plaintiffs with
noneconomic damages less than $250,000 and those with
noneconomic damages greater than $250,000 by completely eliminat-
ing all noneconomic damages.10° The Supreme Court of California
explained that its role under the rational basis standard is to "conduct
a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence
between the classification and the legislative goals." ''
The court may not properly strike down a statute simply because
it disagrees with the wisdom of the law or because it believes that
there is a fairer method dealing with the problem. "The forum for the
correction of ill-considered legislation is a responsive legislature."10 2
The choice between reasonable alternative methods for achieving a
given objective is generally for the legislature.
In a vigorous dissent the chief justice of the Supreme Court of
California asserted that the "[v]ictims of medical negligence, espe-
cially those afflicted with severe injuries, have been singled out to pro-
vide the bulk of this relief."'' 3 Even though the weight of authority
98. Id.
99. Id. at 168, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
100. Id. The court commented that "just as the complete elimination of a cause of action
has never been viewed as invidiously discriminating within the class of victims who have lost
the right to sue, the $250,000 limitation-which applies to all malpractice victims-does not
amount to an unconstitutional discrimination." Id.
101. Id. The court went on to speculate on the legislature's reasons for enacting the
limitation and indicated that any reasonable purpose would justify its adoption:
The Legislature could reasonably have determined that an across-the-board limit
would provide a more stable base on which to calculate insurance rates.
Furthermore, they may have felt that the fixed $250,000 limit would promote
settlements by eliminating "the unknown possibility of phenomenal awards for
pain and suffering that can make litigation worth the gamble." Finally, the
Legislature simply may have felt that it was fairer to malpractice plaintiffs in
general to reduce only the very large noneconomic damage awards, rather than
to diminish the more modest recoveries for pain and suffering and the like in the
great bulk of cases. Each of these grounds provides a sufficient rationale for the
$250,000 limit.
Id.
102. Id. at 172, 695 P.2d at 687, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 400 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
103. Id. The chief justice observed that recent statutes deprived malpractice plaintiffs of the
benefit of various general rules which normally govern personal injury litigation. Id. See, e.g.,
CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 667.7 (West 1975) (exception to general rule requiring immediate
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from other jurisdictions supports the invalidation of the challenged
provision, the statute plainly and simply denies severely injured mal-
practice victims compensation for negligently inflicted harm.'0 4
Unlike the majority, the chief justice agreed with the Carson
court's conclusion that it was "unreasonable" to require the most
severely injured victims of medical negligence to support the health
care industry. This conclusion is as relevant under a rational relation
test as it is under an intermediate form of scrutiny. 10 5 Chief Justice
Bird also noted that the only other constitutionally valid statute limit-
ing the liability of health care providers included a state-run compen-
sation fund as well. '0 6 By contrast, the California statute is not linked
to a similar fund. 107
The chief justice urged the court to apply a "heightened" level of
equal protection scrutiny, and noted that the $250,000 limit on
noneconomic damages could not survive any "serious and genuine
judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and
the legislative goals."' 0' Though the statute admittedly serves the
legitimate objective of preserving insurance, that alone is not enough.
Each statutory classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons simi-
larly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 109
Also dissenting, Justice Mosk expressed his disagreement with
the chief justice's proposed level of scrutiny. Justice Mosk preferred
lump sum payment of a judgment); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (1975) (special
restrictions on attorney fees); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (1975) (special limit on noneconomic
damages); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (1975) (abrogation of collateral source rule).
104. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 172, 695 P.2d at 687, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 400 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
105. Id. The majority distinguished Carson on the grounds that the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire applied an intermediate level of equal protection which is not appropriate under
the California Constitution. Id. at 173, 695 P.2d at 688, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 401. (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting); see supra note 93 and accompanying text. The majority further asserted that, with
the exception of Carson, the decisions of other jurisdictions invalidated statutes that were more
oppressive than the California statute at issue here. These statutes restricted recovery for all
types of injury. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Contra Baptist Hosp. of S.E. Tex. v. Baber, 672
S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (where a Texas appellate court invalidated a $500,000 limit
that applied only to damages other than medical expenses). See Simon v. St. Elizabeth
Medical Center, 30 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio C.P. 1976) (where an Ohio
appellate court stated in dictum that a $200,000 limit on "general" damages violated the
United States and Ohio Constitutions). These provisions were not markedly more severe than
MICRA's $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 173, 695 P.2d at 688,
211 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 174, 695 P.2d at 689, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 402 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 175, 695 P.2d at 690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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an intermediate test.'10 He suggested that the court should have used
a balancing test so as to characterize the malpractice statute as a rea-
sonable measure in furtherance of a public interest. The Mosk bal-
ancing test would weigh "the restrictions of private rights sought to
be imposed" against "the benefits sought to be conferred upon the
general public." I "
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
A. Equal Protection
The Supreme Court of California's use of the rational basis test is
in harmony with past decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has applied two standards
in challenging a state statute on equal protection grounds-strict
scrutiny" 2 and rational basis. In order to withstand a strict scrutiny
review, a statute must be precisely tailored to serve a compelling state
interest." 3 The rational basis standard requires that the classification
110. The level of scrutiny for the intermediate test is whether the challenged classifications
are reasonable and have a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation. See
id. at 181, 695 P.2d at 694, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Bird's
recommendation of a heightened level of scrutiny suggests that any inquiry beyond the rational
relation test will result in the limitation being held unconstitutional. See id. at 175, 695 P.2d at
690, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 181, 695 P.2d at 694, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
112. Courts apply the strict scrutiny test when the challenged state law creates a suspect
class such as race. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (holding that a Florida
statute prohibiting an unmarried interracial couple from habitually living in and occupying the
same room in the nighttime violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
and is invalid). The test also applies to alienage and ancestry. Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage: invalidating an Arizona statute which required aliens to reside
in the United States for 15 years before they are eligible for general assistance); Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948) (ancestry: holding a California statute which effected
an escheat to the state of the land recorded in the name of a minor American citizen because a
Japanese alien who was ineligible for naturalization had paid for the land). The test applies to
categories impinging upon a fundamental right. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87
(1978) (invalidating a Wisconsin statute which required proof that a parent had met support
obligations for existing children before that parent could remarry); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
154-64 (1973) (ruling unconstitutional a Texas criminal abortion statute which proscribes
procuring or attempting to procure an abortion except for medical reasons to save the mother's
life); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (invalidating a Texas statutory scheme which
required all candidates for political office to pay fees ranging as high as $8,900); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (holding unconstitutional statutory provisions which
deny welfare assistance to persons who are residents and meet all other eligibility requirements
except that they have not resided within the jurisdiction for at least a year immediately
proceeding the application for assistance); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 460-62 (1958) (holding that members of the NAACP are entitled under the federal
constitution to be protected from being compelled by the State of Alabama to disclose their
affliation with the Association).
113. Plyler v. DOE, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 217 (1982) (held that a Texas statute which
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created by the challenged legislation bear only a rational relation to a
legitimate government objective. 14
In recent years, the Supreme Court has developed an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny.115 Under this standard, a statutory classification
is valid if it substantially furthers a purported legislative purpose.
Although the reviewing court does not question the legitimacy of the
legislative rationale, a state must give greater justification for a statute
classification than a rational basis analysis requires.1 16
The standard that the reviewing state court selects and applies
when evaluating statutory limitations on medical malpractice recov-
eries will in most cases determine the outcome of the case. Where the
court utilizes the rational basis test, the statute is nearly always
withholds from local school districts any state funds for education of children who were not
"legally admitted" into the United States, and which authorizes local school districts to deny
enrollment to such children, violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
114. In cases that do not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right, the Court
tests state statutes by applying the rational basis standard.
The constitutional safeguard [of equal protection] is offended only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any statement of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (upholding a Maryland statute which
prohibits the sale on Sunday of only certain merchandise).
In Fein the record clearly supports the finding that the California legislature had a "plau-
sible reason" to believe that the limitation on noneconomic recovery would limit the rise in the
cost of malpractice insurance. The rising cost of medical malpractice insurance threatened to
curtail the availability of medical care and created a real possibility that many doctors would
practice without insurance. This would leave injured patients with the prospect of uncollecti-
ble judgments. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of California
concluded that it was reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that placing a ceiling on
noneconomic damages would help reduce the amount of malpractice insurance premiums.
Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 142, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (1985).
115. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Eyolvinq Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 20-24 (1972). This level of scrutiny is
sometimes referred to as the "means scrutiny" test. Id. at 22.
116. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a rational basis
supports Section 3333.2 of the California Civil Code in limiting recovery for noneconomic
losses to $250,000 and, thus, did not violate the equal protection clause of the federal
constitution). The Supreme Court has applied this intermediate level of scrutiny to gender
based classifications. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that an Oklahoma
statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of
21 and females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied
males 18-21 years of age equal protection of the law). The Court has also applied the
intermediate test to categories premised on legitimacy. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1972) (invalidating an Illinois law which allowed illegitimate children to inherit by
intestate succession only from their mothers, even though legitimate children could inherit by
intestate succession from either parent).
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upheld. 1 17 Every state legislature that enacted medical malpractice
statutes did so in response to the purported medical mapractice crisis.
Under the rational basis test, courts have not questioned whether a
crisis actually exists, or the underlying causes of a purported crisis.
Rather, the relevant question for courts evaluating crisis motivated
legislation is whether a rational relationship exists between the stated
objective of the statute and the classification created. For these courts
this question is naturally answered in the affirmative." 8
The intermediate/means scrutiny test generally yields the oppo-
site result." 9 Under this test the courts examine the statute to deter-
mine whether it substantially furthers a legitimate legislative
objective. Medical malpractice crisis legislation is purposefully
intended to stabilize insurance rates so as to assure the availability of
health care to the public. Under the intermediate level of scrutiny, as
with the rational basis test, courts evaluating crisis motivated legisla-
tion have not questioned the underlying causes of the purported crisis.
Unlike the rational basis test, the intermediate standard does question
whether there is a fair and substantial relationship between the legisla-
tion and its purported objective. This requires an inquiry into the
factual basis of the legislature's decision to pass the medical malprac-
117. Federal courts employing the rational basis test have also found challenged statutes
constitutional. See Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
constitutional a California statute limiting recovery of noneconomic damages to $250,000 in
medical malpractice actions); Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330, 332 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding
constitutional an Iowa statute that treated certain malpractice victims differently from others);
DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1980)
(holding constitutional a Virginia statute that required prior notice of intention to file a
medical malpractice action and mediation by a panel of physicians and lawyers); Woods v.
Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1173 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that because there is no
fundamental right to recover tort damages, the burden is upon the challenger to show that the
restriction is wholly arbitrary).
118. One writer has critized the courts for blandly applying the rational basis test as a
substitute for meaningful analysis when "the means-oriented scrutiny test [also known as the
intermediate scrutiny test] ... would raise the level of the minimal scrutiny of the statute from
virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry." Note, Iowa Code Section 147.136 Which
Abolishes the Collateral Source Rule in Medical Malpractice Cases is Not Constitutional, Based
on a Rational Relation Test, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 849, 852 (1980). There are also two practical
reasons for applying the means scrutiny test to medical malpractice legislation today. First,
the legislation responds to a perceived "crisis" which no longer exists. Circumstances have
changed; physicians are better able to get insurance. See Cunningham & Lane, Malpractice-
the Illusory Crisis, 54 FLA. BAR J. 114, 119 (1980). Second, the statutes are not achieving the
goal of effecting a speedy resolution of claims. In Indiana, for example, of 2,302 cases filed by
May 31, 1983, 1,136 were still pending and only 18% had had panel decisions rendered. The
average pendency of cases reaching a panel decision was 23.4 months, with one case still
pending after 84.34 months. Williams, Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act-The Developing
Law, 27 RES GESTAE 494, 497 (1984).
119. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 933, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (1980); Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978).
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tice act. Thus far, courts using the intermediate level of scrutiny have
found that the statutes limiting medical malpractice recoveries do not
substantially further the legislative objective. 12
B. Due Process
Traditionally, federal courts evaluating the constitutional due
process issue of a state statute have applied a rational basis standard
of review. 2 ' When courts apply the rational basis standard in evalu-
ating a state law on due process grounds, there is a presumption of
constitutionality, and the law is upheld absent proof of arbitrariness
or irrationality on the part of the lawmaking body. 22 Previously, the
Supreme Court held that the federal constitution prevents federal
courts from reviewing factual determinations made by a state legisla-
ture. "Under the system of government created by our Constitution,
it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility
of legislation."' 123
State courts have been reluctant to use a determinative due pro-
cess analysis when evaluating state statutes limiting medical malprac-
tice recoveries. The first consideration by the courts is generally
whether an injured party can have a property right in a level of recov-
ery. Courts have uniformly answered this question in the negative. 124
There is, however, a question as to whether there should be a corre-
sponding quid pro quo where a common law right to recovery is lim-
ited by legislative enactment. 125 Courts have overcome this question
120. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 443-51 (1983). See
supra note 119.
121. Id. at 443.
122. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). The Court went on to explain this
constitutional limitation:
We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies,
who are elected to pass laws. . . . Legislative bodies have broad scope to
experiment with economic problems, and this Court does not sit to "subject the
State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our
Government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure."
Id. at 730 (citation omitted).
In Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., the Court stated that "the due process clause is
[not] to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a strait-
jacket when they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which they regard as
offensive to the public welfare. 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949).
123. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 731-32.
124. See, e.g., Werner v. Southern Cal. Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 129, 216 P.2d 825, 833
(1950); Feckenscher v. Gamble, 12 Cal. 2d 482, 499-500, 85 P.2d 885, 902 (1938); Tulley v.
Tranor, 53 Cal. 274, 280 (1878).
125. Learner, supra note 24, at 145.
1986] 1095
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1075
by centering their attentions on whether the invalidation of the statute
will also render the health insurance market of the applicable state
incapable of providing adequate recoveries for plaintiffs. 26
IV. THE IMPACT OF Fein v. Permanente Medical Group
The Fein v. Permanente Medical Group opinion represents a step
backwards for medical malpractice attorneys who have sought to
invalidate or remove legislation which limits medical malpractice
recoveries. The medical malpractice crisis gave rise to legislative
reform. Uncertainty as to the adequacy of health care in the midst of
the rising cost or lack of medical malpractice insurance has inspired
legislators to enact statutes limiting maximum recoveries in medical
malpractice suits. State courts have evaluated these statutes on the
basis of the equal protection and due process clauses of the federal
and applicable state constitutions. These courts, like their legisla-
tures, have produced varied results.
. The due process issue seems to be the greater constitutional chal-
lenge for state statutes limiting medical malpractice recoveries. Jus-
tice White, the only Supreme Court justice to write in Fein,
questioned in dissent "[w]hether Due Process required a legislatively
enacted compensation scheme or a quid pro quo for the common law
or state law remedy it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be."' 2 7
The majority in Fein addresses this question directly. "[A] plaintiff
has no vested property right in a particular measure of damages.
Thus, the fact that the section [California Civil Code section 3333.2
(1975)] may reduce a plaintiff's award does not render the provision
unconstitutional so long as the measure is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest."' 2
8
Through all of this, few courts have examined whether a medical
malpractice crisis actually exists. It appears that the total blame for
the medical malpractice crisis centers on a battle between physicians
and attorneys. Insurance companies are presumably only reacting to
the economics of the matter.
One writer suggests that an inquiry into the underlying causes of
a crisis should be within the realm of the court. He blames the insur-
ers for covertly manufacturing the medical malpractice crisis. 2 9
126. Id.
127. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 106 S. Ct. 214, 216 (1985).
128. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d at 141, 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr.
at 380.
129. Londrigan, The Medical Malpractice Crisis, TRIAL, May 1985, at 22, 24.
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Moreover, he asserts that immunity from federal antitrust laws 3 ° and
the absence of state statutory rate restraints' have permitted insurers
to arbitrarily withdraw liability insurance from a selected state while
still writing policies in neighboring states.'32 The impact of insurers
selectively providing insurance was immediate, and gave rise to the
medical malpractice crisis.133 An inquiry into the underlying causes
of a crisis would not occur where the evaluating court uses the
rational basis test. Only a court using an intermediate form of scru-
tiny would look toward the cause of a crisis when considering the
constitutionality of a statute.
Legislators enacted statutes to lower malpractice rates and courts
approved these statutes because they were rationally related to the
stated legislative goals. Factors unrelated to this crisis legislation are
responsible for achieving these goals. I" The question follows whether
a proponent of crisis legislation would have to factually prove a crisis
for the legislation to pass constitutional muster. The Supreme Court
of Idaho in Jones v. State Board of Medicine 35 anticipating this prob-
lem remanded the case to determine whether a medical malpractice
crisis actually existed in the state of Idaho. Furthermore, the court
declared that, when confronting a statute limiting medical malprac-
tice recoveries, they would use an intermediate level of scrutiny in
evaluating the relevant due process and equal protection issues. 136
The Supreme Court's dismissal of the Fein appeal, although hav-
ing some precedential value, does not provide any real guidance for
130. Id. One recent court of appeals decision gave the antitrust exemption a broad
interpretation. Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
131. Londrigan, supra note 129, at 24. Congress premised the antitrust exemption on the
existence of effective state regulation of ratemaking. State insurance agencies originally
required prior approval of new liability insurance rates to be placed in the statute. Because of
changes in state laws and budgetary constraints, most states no longer require prior approval.
Id.
132. In the malpractice crisis of 1975, major liability carriers like St. Paul and Aetna
stopped writing medical malpractice insurance in many states, but continued to
write policies in others. This selective withdrawal allocated the medical
malpractice market and eliminated competition among insurers. In the absence
of both national antitrust regulation and effective state rate regulation, medical
malpractice rates rose dramatically.
Id.
133. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
134. Londrigan, supra note 129, at 25. The legislation gave rise to "a favorable climate to
defend medical malpractice actions .... Medical malpractice claims litigated during the three-
and-a-half years after 1975 resulted in defense verdicts in 81 percent of the cases." Id. (quoting
the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLOSED CLAIMS 1975-1978 at 3 (Sept. 1980)).
135. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976); see supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
136. Jones, 97 Idaho at 870, 555 P.2d at 411.
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state legislatures or courts. Some state legislatures may mimic the
California statute by placing a similar limit on pain and suffering
while leaving compensatory damages unaffected. Justice White's con-
cern with the adequacy of the recovery suggests that a lesser limita-
tion may not pass constitutional muster. This observation will
probably influence legislators to keep their maximum recoveries at a
high level as more states enact statutes affecting medical malpractice
recoveries.
Medical malpractice statutes developed in "crisis" motivated leg-
islatures present an interesting timing dilemma for the court evaluat-
ing the appropriate standard of scrutiny. The court should defer to
the legislature which passes a statute to alleviate the detrimental
effects of a confirmed crisis. In this case the court would tend to use a
rational relation test which denies any intrusion into the legislative
justifications for the statute. In the case where a crisis never existed
or has already passed, the court may question whether the legislation
is still valid. Courts using the rational relation test will probably defer
to the legislature and should find the statute valid. Should a court
prefer to use an intermediate test, it will probably find a tenuous rela-
tionship between the statute and its objective. In the wake of a nonex-
istent or passe crisis, the court will likely invalidate the statute. By
failing to provide definitive guidelines for evaluating statutes limiting
medical malpractice recoveries, the Supreme Court has left the future
of this crisis legislation in the hands of state courts. 37
V. CONCLUSION
At this time, the Supreme Court appears to be reluctant to
develop a definite position on whether to approve the imposition of
statutory caps on medical malpractice recoveries. The Court's
implied use of the traditional rational relation test sidestepped the
equal protection and due process issues presented in this case.
Employing the intermediate/means scrutiny test could commit the
Court to an examination of the particular facts and policies underly-
ing the passage of each state medical malpractice statute. In the
absence of a national standard that limits medical malpractice recov-
eries, the Supreme Court will probably stay out of the business of
determining the constitutionality of state statutes limiting recoveries.
State supreme courts are split on whether statutes limiting medi-
137. An interesting question to consider is whether the Supreme Court would have
dismissed an appeal of Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). In this case the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire found unconstitutional a statute nearly identical to the one
upheld in Fein. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
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cal malpractice recoveries are constitutional. In the absence of any
further Congressional or Supreme Court guidance, the fate of statu-
tory caps on medical malpractice claims is as wide open as the recov-
eries which have inspired the need for crisis legislation.
DARYL L. JONES*
* The author wishes to dedicate this note to his beautiful wife, Myoushi, and his sons,
Derek and Durel, for patiently bearing with him and supporting him throughout his law
school experience.
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